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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
established rule of construction is that general words are to have a general
operation. 17 It is also a rule, however, that the manifest intent of the legislature
shall prevail over a literal interpretation of the words being construed. 18
Applying these rules to the Toomey case, it does not seem that the majority
has shown any legislative intent that would afford ground for qualifying or
restraining the literal meaning of the words used. The majority appeared
alarmed by the seemingly radical results that might be reached under a broader
interpretation of the section. However, the desirability or undesirability of the
effects of legislation would seem to be purely a matter of legislative judgment,
not to be substituted by that of the judiciary. 19
MISCELLANEOUS
State Not Liable Under Jones Act For Injuries To Its Seamen
In Maloney v. State,' the plaintiff brought an action against the state in the
Court of Claims for the death of her husband, an employee of the state. She
alleged that since her husband was a seaman, such action was permitted by the
Jones Act, a federal statute allowing seamen to recover from their employers
for personal injuries.2 She further alleged that section 8 of the Court of Claims
Act waived the state's immunity and gave the Court of Claims the right to
determine the staite's liability in accordance with the same rules applicable to
action against individuals or corporations in the Supreme Court of New York,
which has jurisdiction over cases arising under the Jones Act.3 However, all
employees of the State of New York are covered by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law, which provides an exclusive remedy, thus precluding such employees
from bringing an action at law against their employer.4 Therefore, the instant
case presented the question of whether these provisions were applicable to the
plaintiff's action.
The Court of Appeals held that the state did not waive its immunity as
to the Jones Act because section 8 of the Court of Claims Act specifically states
17. In Re DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 214, 101 N.E.2d 464, 467 (1951).
18. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. N.Y.C.R. Co., 253 N.Y. 49, 170 N.E. 489
(1930).
19. Lawrence Const. Corporation v. State, 293 N.Y. 634, 639, 59 N.E.2d 630,
632 (1944).
1. 207 Misc. 894, 141 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Ct. C1. 1955); 2 A.D.2d 195, 154 N.Y.S.2d 132
(4th Dep't 1956); 3 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1957).
2. 46 U.S.C.A. §688.
3. Wagner v. Panama Ry., 299 N.Y. 432, 87 N.E.2d 444 (1949): Lynort v.
Great Lakes Transit Corp., 234 N.Y. 626, 138 N.E. 473 (1922).
4. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §11.
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that nothing shall be construed to affect, alter or repeal any provision of the
Wbrkmen's Compensation Law. The intent of the statute is dearly stated;
therefore, the exclusiveness of the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation
Law is not altered by the Court of Claims Act.
Substfiution Of Attorneys
By virtue of the peculiar relationship existing between attorneys and their
clients, the latter are accorded the privilege of discharging the former for any
reason whatsoever, in which event any existing agreement of retainer is termi-
nated and the attorney may recover only on a quantum meruit basis, for services
rendered,5 unless, without objection, the discharged attorney elects to take a
percentage of the final judgment or settlement, where a substitution of attorneys
takes place.6 The substitution of attorneys by a client is generally governed by
Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Practice, and may be done either by stipu-
lation or by order,7 an order directing substitution being without prejudice to a
charging lien of the first attorney.
8
The problem most intimately connected with the discharge or substitution
of attorneys is that of establishing the compensation due for services rendered
by the attorney being discharged. By statute, an attorney's compensation is
made subjec to agreement "express or implied, which is not restrained by law."9
There is no general power on the part of the courts to limit the amount of the
fees charged by an attorney' ° in the absence of facts indicating that the charge
was "extortionate or excessive, or out of proportion to the value of the services""
or that the agreement "was induced by fraud, or, in view of the nature of the
clim, that the compensation provided for was so excessive as to evince a
5. Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916).
6. Podbielski v. Conrad, 286 App. Div. 1040, 145 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't
1955).
7. N.Y.R. Civ. PpAc. 56:
An attorney of record for an adult party or corporation may
be changed by the filing with the clerk of the court in which
action or proceeding may be pending of a stipulation in
writing for such change of attorney, signed by the attorney
and signed and acknowledged by the party. The making and
filing of such a stipulation shall have the same effect as an
order of substitution. An attorney may also be changed by
order.
See also N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT §240 which pertains generally when an attorney has
been discharged or otherwise incapacitated.
8. Re Lydig, 262 N.Y. 408, 187 N.E. 298 (1933). The attorney's charging
lien is established under authority of N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §475.
9. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §474.
10. Murray v. Waring Hat Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 514, 127 N.Y. Supp. 78
(2d Dep't 1911); Werner v. Knowlton, 107 App. Div. 158, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1054
(4th Dep't 1905).
11. Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 127, 152 N.E. 696, 698 (1926).
